In the latest sign of a dramatic deterioration in relations, Niger’s military rulers appear determined to kick France out of any key sector of their economy – and uranium mining in particular.
This week the French company Orano announced that the junta – which ousted French ally President Mohamed Bazoum in a coup in July 2023 – has taken control of local mining firm Somaïr.
The company’s efforts to resume exports have been blocked by the government for months and are being thrown into financial trouble.
And the impact could be felt far and wide – although Niger accounts for less than 5% of the world’s uranium production, by 2022 it will account for a quarter of the supply of nuclear power plants across Europe.
So the time will not be too difficult, as the West struggles to face the challenge of climate change and reduce carbon emissions from electricity production.
For French President Emmanuel Macron, who is already battling a political crisis at home, Orano’s possible departure from Niger is not ideal.
Because it coincides with sad news from other long-time African allies – Chad has suddenly announced the end of the defense agreement with Paris, and Senegal has confirmed its insistence on finally closing the French military base in Dakar.
But in any case, the crisis facing Orano in Niger represents an important challenge for France’s energy supply.
With 18 nuclear plants, a total of 56 reactors, generating about 65% of its electricity, France has been leading the game in containing carbon emissions from the energy sector.
But the country’s limited production of uranium ended more than 20 years ago.
So, in the last decade or so, it has imported about 90,000 tons – a fifth of which comes from Niger. Only Kazakhstan – which accounts for 45% of global production – was the most important source of supply.
“Yellowcake” uranium is an important ingredient in the production of nuclear energy [Getty Images]
The continued paralysis, or outright closure, of Orano’s operations in Niger will force France to look elsewhere.
This should be achieved, as some goods can be found in countries including Uzbekistan, Australia and Namibia.
Last year, as West African neighbors responded to the coup in Niger by imposing trade restrictions that crippled uranium exports, some suppliers fell prey to the law.
The European Union’s imports of minerals from the country fell by a third, but this was replaced by Canada.
But there was also a political price to pay. EU uranium imports from Russia have risen by more than 70%, despite tough sanctions imposed on Moscow over its invasion of Ukraine.
And of course, it is Russia that has become the new best friend of the military leaders who have seized power in Niger and its neighboring countries, Burkina Faso and Mali, since 2020.
Russian military contractors are fighting alongside the Malian army in its campaign against jihadists and Tuareg separatists, while also helping protect the top leadership of the juntas in Niger and Burkina Faso.
So while France, and Europe in general, would be able to find ways to deal with the certain loss of Niger’s uranium supply, the transition would not be entirely comfortable.
At least in the short term, EU states will likely rely more on Russia and its central Asian neighbors, thus undermining their effort to maintain economic pressure on President Vladimir Putin at a potentially crucial time in the Ukraine crisis.
Furthermore, the Niger state, whose attitude towards the EU as a whole has become almost as distrustful as its broken relationship with France, continues to seek alternatives to the old Western alliance.
And Iran — a potential customer of, yes, uranium — emerged as an option.
Relations between the two governments have deepened, with Niger’s Prime Minister Ali Mahamane Lamine Zeine visiting Tehran in January. Rumors of a possible agreement to supply uranium “yellowcake” (concentrate) were briefly circulated a few months ago.
Meanwhile, the outlook for Orano’s hopes of restoring normal uranium operations and uranium exports from Niger looks bleak, given the hostile attitude of the military regime in Niamey.
That tension is partly explained by Macron’s vocal criticism of the July 2023 overthrow of Bazoum, who was one of his closest political and security allies in Africa.
Paris strongly endorsed the tough stance of the West African regional group Ecowas, and was rumored to be ready to offer tacit support if the bloc went ahead with its short-term threat of military intervention in Niger to restore Bazoum.
In this toxic atmosphere of hatred and mistrust, Orano was an obvious and ready target for the junta’s revenge.
Niger has seen a rise in nationalism since last year’s coup [Getty Images]
The French company’s large role in the uranium sector for years fueled anger among many Nigeriens, amid allegations that the French company was buying their uranium cheaply, despite occasional talks about an export deal. Although mining operations began many years after independence, they were seen as a sign of France’s continued post-colonial influence.
After last year’s coup d’état, Orano also tried to get out of the official ranks, keep a low profile and continue to operate normally.
But the trade ban on Ecowas has prevented it from exporting the product from the Somaïr mine, near Arlit, in the Sahara desert.
And even after the sanctions were lifted in late February, the normal uranium export route, which passes through the Benin port of Cotonou, remains closed, because the junta has kept the border closed in the ongoing political row with Benin.
Orano offered to fly the uranium out, but the government rejected the proposal.
In June the junta canceled the rights of a French company to develop a new mine in the large Imouraren deposit, which had been seen as the uranium sector’s main hope for future growth.
Meanwhile, the export embargo was pushing Somaïr, which in November was sitting on 1,150 tonnes of blocked uranium stocks worth $210m (£165m), into financial trouble.
And when Orano decided to stop further production and prioritize the payment of workers’ wages, relations with the government deteriorated so much that they almost completely collapsed this week.
Yes, it is not only the company but also the economy of Niger that is paying the price for this situation, in the loss of export profits and endangering hundreds of jobs.
For Arlit and other northern desert communities, this could be a devastating blow, despite talk of renewed activity in a Chinese mining project in the region and some interest in the sector among other potential partners.
But Niger’s official does not see the need to make an agreement with Orano because he is now encouraged by the large increase in oil exports to foreign countries, thanks to the new pipeline built by the Chinese.
With that financial cushion, the regime appears ready to bear the cost of crippling and possibly severing normal uranium relations with France – now its biggest international adversary.
Paul Melly is the coordinator of the Africa Program at Chatham House in London.
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